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Abstract— Air traffic controller shortages remain a significant 
challenge in European ATM. Comparing different rules, we 
quantify the cost effectiveness of adding controller hours to Area 
Control Centre regulations to avert the delay cost impact on 
airlines. Typically, adding controller hours results in a net 
benefit. Distributions of delay duration and aircraft weight play 
an important role in determining the total cost of a regulation. 
Errors are likely to be incurred when analysing performance 
based on average delay values, particularly at the disaggregate 
level. 
Keywords-controller hours; cost non-linearity; cost of delay; 
regulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports on early analyses supporting the 
‘ComplexityCosts’ project. The primary objective of the 
project is to better understand European air traffic management 
(ATM) network performance trade-offs for different 
stakeholder mechanisms. We define such mechanisms as those 
designed to afford resilience for one or more stakeholders 
during disturbance, and to which we may assign a monetary 
cost. 
One such mechanism is adding controller hours to Area 
Control Centre (ACC) regulations in order to avert the delay 
cost impact on airlines. This paper focuses primarily on the 
cost effectiveness of such actions. The wider project modelling 
and application of the disturbances have been described earlier 
[1] and are on-going. 
Overall, capacity and weather-related issues are the main 
reasons for Air Traffic Flow (and Capacity) Management 
(ATF(C)M) regulations [2]. From our analyses, ATCO (air 
traffic controller) staff shortages were the sixth most common 
reason for implementing ATFM regulations, the fifth highest 
by ATFM delay costs generated, and the fourth highest by total 
minutes of delay. In 2014, average, daily en-route ATFM 
delays increased by 17.4% mainly due to: ATC capacity 
(+27.8%), en-route ATC staffing (+44.9%) and en-route 
weather (+23%) delay [2]. Staff shortages thus remain a 
significant challenge in European ATM. 
In this paper, Section II presents an overview of the state of 
the art. In Section III, the methodology is presented. The 
analysis of the results and main findings are described in 
Section IV. Conclusions and planned further work are 
presented in Section V. 
II. STATE OF THE ART
Increasing ATCO hours to alleviate delay is a complicated 
issue. Challenges facing ANSPs with regard to the strategic 
planning of ATCOs include the unpredictability of future 
traffic and fairly long (approximately 3 year) lead times for 
ATCO training. From a tactical perspective, the assignment of 
ATCO hours depends on two major factors: (i) flexible 
rostering; and, (ii) controller mobility. With regard to rostering, 
some ANSPs are constrained by rigid staffing policies, which 
do not take account of traffic variations during the day. This 
leads to over-staffing during off-peak periods and controller 
shortages during periods of greatest demand, whilst, crucially, 
the total ATCO hours required to obviate or optimise delays 
might actually be available.  
ATCO workload is recognised in the literature as one of the 
main capacity bottlenecks for en-route airspace [3]. When 
demand cannot be accommodated by opening further sectors 
(i.e. the airspace is already at its maximum number of 
operational sectors or there is a lack of staff), ATFCM 
measures, and hence delays, are introduced. Staff-related 
disruptions can be produced due to insufficient planning, but 
the tactical management of resources during the day of 
operations also plays a significant role (ibid.) As reported in 
[4], in general, there is also an overstaffing effect associated 
with seasonal cycles. During periods where demand is low, e.g. 
winter, ATCOs are still often called on duty due to contractual 
agreements. 
En-route ACCs sectors are commonly managed by a team 
of two ATCOs: an executive and a planner controller [5]. This 
assignment could change during exceptionally low or high 
demand, e.g. with both roles carried out by a single ATCO or 
adding a third controller to a team [5, 6].  
Dynamically optimising the number of ATCOs required 
has been addressed in previous research, such as [6]. However, 
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various limitations to dynamic management exist (e.g. ATCOs 
should have two hours’ break per shift) [3]. The process 
typically begins months in advance, the objective of the ANSPs 
being to provide sufficient workforce through the day whilst 
minimising the associated cost. This operational plan evolves 
until the publication of the final ATCO rosters. Some ANSPs, 
instead of using rigid master planning, implement a strategic 
planning process approach with progressive refinement as 
more information becomes available, as typified by the 
following sequence of phases [7]: 
(1) Master (or strategic): e.g. from twelve to three months 
prior to execution day. An analysis based on economic 
conditions, available staffing and future traffic is carried out to 
produce the master plan for the sector opening scheme and the 
roster pre-publication. At this stage, the maximum amount of 
time all ATCOs can work during a single day is considered. (2) 
Planning: until two weeks or so prior to execution, the master 
plan is monitored and the roster is published. (3) Pre-tactical: 
the master plan is updated and an optimisation of the flexible 
shifts is carried out up to the day before operations. (4) 
Tactical: the day before execution, the master plan is updated 
based on short-term information and becomes the day of 
operations plan. (5) Execution: dynamic information is 
considered during the execution phase. (Often, (4) and (5) are 
both considered as ‘tactical’.) 
An example is the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre 
where demand-based rostering is deployed, in conjunction with 
monthly efficiency monitoring. Various tools developed in-
house are used in the rostering process, including ‘TimeZone’ 
[7]. This tool is used primarily strategically (around 12 months 
in advance) to determine the most efficient number of shifts 
required, and then pre-tactically (D-14 days) to tactically, for 
finely-controlled, optimised position planning and shift time 
allocations in the ops room. Fully integrated with this tool, and 
deployed between the strategic and pre-tactical phases, is the 
‘Ops Roster Tool’, which takes ATCO personal preferences 
into account and builds individual controller assignments. 
Various constraints are taken into consideration when 
developing such planning processes, such as: shift durations, 
breaks, multiple-tasking, ATCO’s qualifications, rotations to 
maintain skill levels and an ability to re-roster in the event of 
unexpected occurrences, demand and workload [8]. Buffers 
may also be introduced at the different planning stages to cope 
with uncertainty; in [3], the inefficiency of these buffers along 
with airspace execution performance is considered as a 
measure of the operating cost efficiency of the ANSP. 
Capacities may also be increased, limiting the impact on the 
number of ATCOs required, with solutions such as multi-sector 
planning (MSP). The implementation of MSP offers medium-
term strategic solutions, planning trajectories over several 
sectors. This has been demonstrated to have significant 
potential to improve the efficiency of ATC resource utilisation 
(see, for example, [9]), and although validated in Europe with 
plans for implementation in progress, has hitherto not been 
substantially applied. 
With many such technology solutions presented above 
readily available, the main reason why some ANSPs have not 
adopted them, and maintained less flexible rostering, is lack of 
social acceptability. Another influencing factor is that single-
manned sectors during peak hours are not permitted in Europe 
(whereas they are in the US, for example). Furthermore, 
regarding ATCO mobility in Europe, forecasting the required 
ATCO numbers is undertaken at the individual ANSP level, 
due to licencing heterogeneity and the absence of any supra-
national pool of controllers. This variously contributes to staff 
shortages (e.g. causing delays) or over-staffing (e.g. causing 
cost inefficiencies). 
Tactical optimisation of resources is out of scope for this 
paper; nor do we consider at this stage issues such as sector 
complexities, workload evaluation and non-linear allocation 
effects. For the evaluations presented, we assume that in order 
to increase the capacity of the ACC, the number of ATCOs 
available is incremented in two-controller steps. This aspect of 
the methodology is elaborated in Section III(B). A key focus of 
our paper is the explicit trade-off between the cost of additional 
controller provision and the associated, disaggregate delay 
costs incurred by airlines, not hitherto explored in the literature. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data 
Regulation and airspace data were sourced from the 
Demand Data Repository 2 (DDR2) [10], using all days in the 
period AIRAC 1313 – AIRAC 1413 (12DEC13 – 07JAN15). 
All flights that operated in Europe (European Civil Aviation 
Conference area) during that period with a trajectory through a 
regulation were initially in scope (1 349 217 flights). 
Commercial passenger flights were selected for the estimation 
of the cost of delay. Aircraft types with an MTOW (maximum 
take-off weight) of less than 15 tonnes were thus excluded, 
along with those that corresponded to military or cargo 
operations and business aviation. 1 304 607 flights remained in 
scope. Some over-estimation of commercial flights may have 
resulted (e.g. commercial aircraft operators flying a cargo 
flight). ATFM regulation data (duration, location and reason) 
were also obtained from the DDR2 database. 
B. Adding extra ATCO hours 
Some simplifying assumptions are applied at this stage of 
the modelling. If, by adding ATCO hours, the regulation could 
not have been avoided, we assume it should have been reported 
as a different cause (e.g. capacity). Instances with (non-capped) 
overflows from adjacent sectors due to an airspace closure, or 
ATCOs being unable to report for work due to bad weather, are 
potential examples of issues associated with the reporting of 
accurate causes. These are also reflected in airline delay 
reporting (especially for reactionary delays). Indeed, the 
allocation of the ‘reason’ code for the regulations is defined at 
the local FMP level and may be somewhat subjective, 
especially were several factors pertain. However, taking the 
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hours to regulations caused by staff shortages, the delay 
generated and associated airline costs would be averted.  
As mentioned, the number of ATCOs available is 
incremented in two-controller steps, thus allowing the use of a 
sectorisation with one additional sector. Such potential 
increments in the number of ATCOs operating in the ACC are 
deployed up to the maximum number of staff reported in the 
same ACC during the AIRAC (Aeronautical Information 
Regulation And Control) period under study, through 
supporting analyses of the DDR2 data. 
Again, notwithstanding some limitations of the approach, 
the modelling in this paper is focused on understanding the 
impact of increasing ATCO hours on regulation delay costs, 
rather than the mechanics of implementing such hours per se. 
Two rules have been defined for the addition of staff. 
Rule 1, ‘fractional-shift ATCO costs’: Extra controller 
time is only added between the start and end of the regulation. 
The extra ATCO effort assigned is represented by the coloured 
shaded areas of Fig. 1. In some cases, the number of controllers 
will be limited by the maximum possible at the ACC. For 
example, adding a further two controllers to an existing four 
extra (i.e. six in total), leads to an effective net increment of 
fewer ATCO hours than adding two further controllers to an 
existing two extra (i.e. four in total). This is because during the 
periods 1400 – 1600 and 1700 – 1800 the maximum number of 
controllers in the ACC is already attained with four extra 
ATCOs. In general, Rule 1 assigns the minimum number of 
ATCO hours required to increase the capacity, also allowing 
fractional hours to be added. It should thus be considered as a 
minimum possible ATCO cost baseline. 
Rule 2, ‘full-shift ATCO costs’: This second rule has been 
designed to best reflect operational requirements. Whole 
ATCO shifts of 7 hours are used as increments, i.e. 14-hour 
blocks for the ATCO pairs. Limited rostering flexibility is 
allowed, in that a regulation of up to 8 hours is deemed 
resolvable by adding effort over 7 hours. Beyond this time, 
another 7-hour block is added, which might sometimes resolve 
a subsequent, separate, regulation, although we have not 
quantified such impacts, nor better optimisations which might 
be achievable within the applied blocks. No optimisation is 
performed regarding the time when the controllers should start 
and end their shifts, as long as the regulation period is covered 
by the additional shifts. 
C. Cost of extra staff 
Full service provision costs can be broken down into three 
economic factors [11]: ATCO-hour productivity, employment 
costs per ATCO-hour, and support costs per composite flight-
hour. Support costs represent 70% of the total provision costs, 
including the employment costs of non-duty staff (e.g. ATCOs 
on other duties, trainees, technical support), non-staff operating 
costs (e.g. energy, communications), exceptional costs, and 
capital-related costs (e.g. depreciation and financing). As we 
are here considering the measure of adding ATCO hours at the 
(pre-)tactical level, only duty ATCO hours are applied. Costs 
such as training and strategic re-sectorisation are not accounted 
for. We have used individual costs per ANSP, as defined in 
[12]. The average cost of an ATCO duty-hour for 2014 was 
EUR 108. 
D. Cost of delay estimation 
The cost of delay to the airlines has been computed using 
provisional, at-gate 2014 costs, building on the team’s earlier 
work for EUROCONTROL [13]1. Explicit values have been 
calculated for fifteen ‘core’ aircraft, by delay duration, 
representing a range of weights and covering 63% of 
movements in the ECAC area. For non-core aircraft, good fits 
of cost with √MTOW were used (r2min = 0.98). 
Although the passenger cost of delay is often a dominating 
delay cost for operators, there remains relatively limited 
evidence supporting the calculation of such costs. A key 
feature is the impact of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, which 
establishes the rules for compensation and assistance to airline 
passengers in the event of denied boarding, cancellation or 
delay. In February 2014, a proposed strengthening of such air 
passenger rights passed its first reading in the European 
Parliament [14]. Furthermore, a number of national rulings 
have impacted the interpretation and application of the 
Regulation, mostly in terms of extending the scope in favour of 
the passenger [15]. Revisions to our passenger cost estimates 
have also taken into account a 2012 study by Steer Davies 
Gleave in support of a Commission Impact Assessment [16]. 
The costs used are primary delay costs, to avoid double-
counting in the network. It is also important to note that such 
delay costs are non-linear as a function of delay duration. For 
example, the average cost per minute at 60 minutes of delay is 
just over fourfold the value for 5 minutes of delay. 
                                                          
1 Our passenger delay cost estimations have gone out to airline consultation. 
Other costs, relating to fuel, maintenance and crew, are more readily 
quantifiable from (published) data sources. It is planned to publish our full 
2014 estimates and supporting methodology, in December 2015. 




Fifth SESAR Innovation Days, 1st – 3rd December 2015
 
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. Regulations and delay cost 
In the period under study there was a total of 22 850 ATFM 
regulations issued, which generated a total of 9.8M minutes of 
delay (6.6M ATFM minutes en-route; 3.2M ATFM minutes 
airport). As a comparison, in [11], for 2014, 9.0M minutes of 
delay were reported (5.6M ATFM minutes en-route; 3.4M 
ATFM minutes airport). These EUROCONTROL-reported 
data (ibid.) cover only the Single European Sky Performance 
Scheme area, and the calendar year 2014, whereas our data 
extend somewhat further geographically and temporally (see 
Section III(A)). 
From the 9.8M minutes of delay in our model, 8.8M 
minutes of delay generated cost (i.e., after excluding cargo, 
military and business aircraft), leading to an estimated cost of 
EUR 489M for the commercial flights (EUR 333M ATFM en-
route; EUR 156M ATFM airport), which gives an average 
primary ATFM delay cost of 55 EUR/min. (Of note, such 
averages vary by cause, ranging from 48 EUR/min for 
aerodrome capacity to 96 EUR/min for industrial actions.) In 
comparison, in [11], the total cost of ATFM delays for 2014 is 
estimated at EUR 710M (EUR 440M en-route; EUR 270M 
airport) in the SES area. An average cost of 79 EUR/min is 
used (ibid.) for the costing of these ATFM departure delays in 
2014, using EUR2009 prices, at the full tactical cost (i.e. 
including reactionary delay). Our calculations (not shown) 
show these costs to be fully consistent, the differences being 
mainly attributable to passenger cost variations and inclusion 
or exclusion of reactionary costs. 
In our calculations, 5.7% (1 317) of all the ATFM 
regulations had staff shortages as the main cause. Of these, 
1 151 regulations were en-route and 166 airport-related. The 
ATCO staff shortage regulations generated 671 746 minutes of 
delay (6.8% of the total ATFM delay) and a total cost of EUR 
30M. 
The regulations applied within an ACC that had more than 
one airspace configuration were analysed further. A total of 
1 112 regulations thus remained (96.6% of all the regulations 
due to en-route ATC staffing shortages). 80 935 flights crossed 
these regulations, of which 33 648 had delays assigned 
(596 525 minutes in total) – an average of 18 minutes of delay 
per delayed flight. After the non-commercial exclusions, there 
were 30 095 such flights generating 528 757 minutes of delay 
and EUR 26M of delay cost – an average of 50 EUR /min. Of 
the 1 112 regulations reported, there were 64 that did not 
generate any delay. 
Since we are interested in the cost generated by the 
regulations, only delay which generated cost will be considered 
in the following analyses. Fig. 2 shows the top ten ANSPs and 
ACCs that generated the maximum delay along with the 
percentage of the total cost generated within that top ten. Note 
that Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS) (ED code) is the ANSP 
that generated the maximum percentage of delay, very closely 
followed by Cyprus DCAC (LC). However, the cost generated 
was higher in the Cyprus airspace than in the German case. 
There were more flights affected in the ED airspace than in the 
airspace of LC (7 229 and 4 979 flights with delay assigned, 
respectively), hence the average delay per delayed flight in 
Germany was 14 min/flight, whilst in Cyprus it was 
21 min/flight. The non-linearity of the relationship between 
cost and delay accounts, partially, for the extra cost of the 
lower total delay of LC, compared with ED. Another factor (as 
presented later) is the weight of the aircraft affected by the 
regulations. 
Focusing on the ACCs, it is observed that with DFS as the 
ANSP generating the overall maximum amount of delay, that 
delay was generated by several ACCs, while in Cyprus, all the 
delay was generated by a single ACC. This means that the 
ACC centre of LCCCCTA was the single greatest contributor 
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of delay and delay cost for the network during the period of 
study. Further analyses are required, but this suggests that the 
Cyprus regulations have higher than average delays assigned to 
aircraft, thus leading to higher costs. 
Note that even with the total number of minutes of delay 
higher in the German airspace, the non-linearity of the cost 
with the delay duration means that the distribution of that delay 
plays a role in the total cost generated. Similar principles are 
observed between the Portuguese and Greek ANSPs: higher 
delays in Portugal led to lower costs than the delays generated 
by Greece due to ATC staffing problems. 
Fig. 3 presents the percentage values of delay cost, delay 
minutes, number of flights affected and aircraft weight, for the 
top 50 regulations that generated the highest delay costs. The 
plot is ordered by delay cost, from highest (left) to lowest. 
Once again, we note how in some cases, the total delay 
generated does not relate directly with the delay cost of that 
regulation. For example, the sixth regulation by cost has a 
lower amount of delay that the seventh regulation, however, 
the average weight of the aircraft going through that regulation 
was higher (average MTOW of 259 tonnes, c.f. 77 tonnes), 
even with a lower average delay (25 mins/flight, c.f. 35 
mins/flight). Thus, both the parameters delay duration and 
aircraft weight play a role in determining the total cost of a 
regulation. 
Fig. 4 summarises the relationships between the delays 
generated by the ATCO shortage regulations and the costs that 
the associated flights incurred due to those delays. The cost that 
would be generated by using the average value instead of 
computing the actual cost for individual flights is also shown in 
the figures. By the ‘average’ value, we are referring to the 
average cost over all regulations of 55 EUR/min cited above. 
Note that there are a significant number of regulations (panel 
(a)) that have a total cost higher than the value obtained using 
the average values. As the data are aggregated by ACCs and 
ANSPs, this variability with respect to the average value is 
reduced (panels (b) and (c)), as the average cost is then closer 
to the average value of the subset of flights analysed. However, 
even at the ANSP level there is a deviation from the average of 
55 EUR/min. For the regulations that were issued due to en-
route ATCO staff shortages, this average value is reduced to 
50 EUR/min. This shows the error that is incurred when 
analysing performance based on average delay values alone. In 
general, assessing the cost individually by particular 
regulations, ACCs or even ANPS, might well generate lower or 
higher costs for similar amounts of delay. Hence, individual 
flight cost computations should be used when deciding which 
areas might have a higher return from a given set of investment 
 
(a) by sectors 
 
(b) by sectors 
Figure 1.  Example of regulations with period of time with number of 
ATCO available equals to maximum of the ACC 
 
(a) by regulations 
 
(b) by ACCs 
 
(c) by ANSPs 
Figure 4. Delay and cost of delay relationship. 
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mechanisms, since a higher delay does not always represent a 
higher cost. When using average values, such effects may often 
be obscured. 
B. Extra staff mechanism analysis 
In this section, the effect of adding extra ATCOs to 
mitigate the regulations due to ATCO staff issues is analysed. 
The average difference between the average number of ACTOs 
available during the regulations and the maximum number of 
ATCOs available at the ACC where the regulation was 
implemented is 4.3 ATCOs. Therefore, there is, on average, the 
possibility of adding four controllers during such regulations. If 
a window of four hours before and after the start and end time 
of the regulation is considered, the difference of the average 
number of ATCOs present during the regulation with respect to 
the maximum number of ATCOs seen in that window period is 
2.4 ATCOs. Thus, in a window close to the regulation it would 
be possible, on average, to increase the number of ATCOs by 
two. 
Two particular types of case have been identified when 
analysing the ATCOs declared as being assigned. 198 (17.8%) 
regulations in scope had, during the regulation, some period of 
time during which the number of ATCOs available was the 
maximum (ever) available for the ACC. Of those, for 60 
regulations (5.4% of the total number) this applied during the 
whole duration of the regulation. In the former case, it was 
assumed that the regulation could be averted by adding 
controllers, while in the latter it was considered that since the 
maximum number of ATCOs was already achieved, adding 
further ATCOs would not avert the regulation. Since the 
categorisation of regulations is carried out at a local FMP level, 
we do not have access to the reasons behind the decision to 
assign such regulations to ATCO staff shortages. Nevertheless, 
those 60 regulations generated a total of 18 111 minutes of 
delay to 1 037 flights, representing EUR 0.9M. 
In the other cases, the cost of adding controllers has been 
computed and compared with the cost of the delay generated 
by the regulation. It is assumed that the regulation would not be 
required after adding such additional staff and, therefore, its 
delay cost would be averted. Fig. 5 presents two regulations as 
examples. 
 Regulation KWUR1C20 of AIRAC 1410 generated 121 
minutes of delay (EUR 5 251). As shown in Fig. 5 (panel (a)), 
Rule 1 adds controllers only during the period of time of the 
regulation, and, as presented in panel (c), the cost of the delay 
generated is high enough such that there is always a net gain by 
adding controllers. Even if the maximum number of controllers 
that the ACC can have in operation is deployed, the net gain is 
EUR 3 800. We note that when controllers are added, at some 
point the maximum number of controllers at the ACC is 
attained and therefore the effort and cost increments are not 
uniform in the plot. If a more operational approach is taken, 
and 7-hour shifts are deployed (Rule 2, panel (e)), then there is 
a break-even point. When the regulation can be resolved by 
adding four controllers in one shift (i.e. 28 extra ATCO hours 
in total), with one group of two controllers there is a net gain. 
However, if more than four controllers are required, then the 
cost of those controllers is higher than the cost of the delay of 
the regulation, and a net loss results. 
Fig. 5 (panels (b), (d) and (f)) presents another example 
(regulation EPJR14N in AIRAC 1407) where, by applying 
Rule 1, it is possible to find a set of increments of ATCO hours 
that leads to a net gain, but, since the delay and the cost of the 
regulation were low (9 minutes and EUR 390), if full shifts 
were added (Rule 2), a net loss results. 
As shown in the previous examples, when adding ATCO 
hours, assuming that the corresponding regulation could be 
averted, three outcomes are possible: 
i) net gain: the cost of the delay is high enough to 
justify adding ATCOs up to the maximum available at 
the ACC;  
ii) net loss: adding controllers leads to higher costs than 
the delay costs; 
iii) trade-off: with a smaller number of controllers their 
cost is off-set by the cost of the delay avoided, 
whereas adding more controllers leads to a higher net 
cost than the avoided delay. 
Table I shows the number of regulations, as a function of 
the above outcomes, under Rule 1 and Rule 2. Under Rule 1, 
87.1% of all the regulations benefit from adding ATCOs, even 
if this represents having the maximum available for the ACC 
during the period of the regulation. For 64 regulations (5.8%), 
adding ATCOs represents a higher cost than the cost of the 
delay generated by the regulation. In 1.7% of the cases, there 
is a trade-off as a function of the number of controllers 
required. Adding operational constraints to better reflect 
practice, under Rule 2, the number of regulations that benefit 
decreases, but still comprise over 70%. In 8.5% of cases a 
trade-off now exists. In 13.4% of cases, adding controllers 
represents a higher cost than the delay potentially averted. In 
total, there were 66 regulations that did not generate any 
reported delay, possibly since they were not the most 
penalising regulation. In summary, in the majority of cases, 
the cost impact on airlines due to the regulations are high 











(a) Regulation KWUR1C20 in AIRAC 1410                                               (b) Regulation EPJR14N in AIRAC 1407 
 
 
(c) Regulation KWUR1C20 in AIRAC 1410 – Rule 1  (d) Regulation EPJR14N in AIRAC 1407 – Rule 1 
 
 
(e) Regulation KWUR1C20 in AIRAC 1410 – Rule 2  (f) Regulation EPJR14N in AIRAC 1407 – Rule 2 
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TABLE I.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE APPLIED AND ADDING ATCOS 
Rule Net gain Net loss Trade-off 
1 87.1% (969) 5.8%   (64) a 1.7% (19) 
2 72.7% (808) 13.4% (149) a 8.5% (95) 
a. 56 regulations in these categories do not have delay. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
If average costs of delay are used per minute of ATFM 
delay, close approximations to actual values (i.e. computed by 
individual delay durations) may be obtained for aggregated 
data (e.g. at an ANSP level). However, for smaller samples 
(e.g. at a regulation or ACC level) the variability of cost values 
around that average, due to different distributions of delays and 
aircraft weights traversing the airspace, renders estimates made 
through averages more prone to error. Therefore, when 
deciding on areas that might benefit from improvement 
mechanisms (adding extra ATCOs, in this case), the 
characteristics of the delays and costs should be considered, 
and not only the total delay generated. 
Results show that, in the majority of cases, the cost of a 
regulation’s delay is sufficiently high to justify adding extra 
ATCO resources, even if that means that the maximum number 
of controllers possible at the ACC are on duty. This controller 
cost is below the delay cost of the regulation in 73% of the 
cases when full 7-hour shifts are added. Note, however, that in 
such cases, the stakeholder bearing the cost (the ANSP) is 
different from the stakeholders obtaining the benefit (the 
airlines and passengers). It is not surprising that one of the key 
points raised by the airspace users in [2] was that continued 
work must be undertaken to address staffing and capacity 
issues. This effect will probably be greater still in future, 
considering the evolution in average aircraft size (and weight) 
in Europe. In 2014, the number of flights was still below 2008 
levels, however, there has been a continuous increase in 
average aircraft weight and passenger numbers [11] – thus 
driving up unit delay costs. This extra cost burden on the 
ANSPs to provide additional resources might also have an 
impact in terms of lower reported productivity, with more 
resources required to handle similar traffic. 
In this research, we have not explicitly established if a 
regulation could actually be averted by adding extra ATCO 
hours. The assumption has been made that if the regulation 
reason indicated was ATCO staff shortages, then by adding 
staff resources, the regulation could be avoided. More detailed 
modelling should be carried out to estimate the impact of such 
extra staff on the capacity that can be provided. For example, 
information on the capacity of different sectorisations could be 
considered. (In future, initiatives such as dynamic sectorisation, 
MSP, mobility of ATCOs, virtual ATC centres, improved 
ATM systems, or merging ACCs and/or ANSPs, may 
contribute to improving ATCO productivity, and these may all 
benefit from improved impact modelling.) In some cases, 
regulations might not be completely averted, but reduced in 
duration and/or intensity. Thus improved trade-offs between 
adding/managing resources and delay could be established. 
Future work should also consider modelling the parameters 
that affect the distribution of delays generated by regulations 
(e.g. regulation duration, capacity declared, demand, etc.). In 
this manner, it would be possible to analyse what 
characteristics of a given regulation are more important when 
generating delay and, especially delay cost, since cost increases 
non-linearly with delay duration. It might be preferred to have 
greater total delay distributed between more flights than higher 
individual delays. 
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